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Intraday analysis of the limit order bias at the  
ex-dividend day of U.S. common stocks 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study places Dubofsky’s (1992) “limit order adjustment hypothesis” under the microscope of 
an intraday analysis, which employs a minute-by-minute trade and quote data recorded during the 
ex-dividend days of common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Dufosky’s (1992) 
model concluded that the asymmetric adjustment of open limit orders for cash dividend payments 
under the NYSE and AMEX rules is sufficient to create abnormal returns on the ex-dividend day. 
Empirical evidence shows that the limit order bias incurred due to the asymmetric adjustment of 
open limit orders seems to dominate the overnight ex-day returns but at the same time, it is 
significantly corrected via active trading up until the close of the ex- dividend day. As a result, the 
significant association of the ex-day price drop discrepancy with the opening limit order bias 
eventually disappears before the ex-dividend day close. Finally, it is found that the reversal of the 
limit order bias is in fact quicker in stocks which are more liquid or listed on NASDAQ where 
strong competition among dealers is envisaged to drive stale quotes closer to the fair adjustment 
of the dividend. 
 
 
Keywords: Ex-dividend day; intraday price drop ratio; order flow bias 
JEL classification: G14, G39  
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1. Introduction 
Dubofsky (1992) argued that a special microstructure feature, that is, the effect of 
exchange rules dictating the dividend adjustment on limit orders that are still open at the 
ex-dividend day of US common stocks, is the main cause for the ex-day abnormal returns 
that have been widely evidenced in the ex-day literature. Dubofsky’s (1992) hypothesis 
challenges the so called “tax hypothesis” that was initially introduced by Elton and 
Gruber (1970) and subsequently supported by several authors. Furthermore, recent 
evidence by Jakob and Ma (2004, 2005) qualify Dubofsky’s (1992) model as a valid 
explanation for the ex-dividend price drop anomaly.  
Dubofsky (1992, 1997) stated that previously placed limit orders that are still standing on 
the opening of the ex-dividend day are capable of inducing a positive return bias on the 
basis of the non-adjustment of limit orders to sell for the omission of the dividend, as 
dictated in the exchange rules. Naturally, the positive abnormal returns are envisaged to 
last until the ex-day close insofar as non-adjusted open limit orders continue to impact 
transaction prices up until the closure of the trading session. This study employs high 
frequency data for stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which pay cash 
dividends during the period from the 21
st
 of October 2010 until the 31
st
 of December 
2011, to examine in particular whether the impact of the order flow bias is in fact 
prevailing throughout the entire duration of the ex-dividend day. Our main finding is that 
although the limit order bias dominates the stock price adjustment for the dividend at the 
open, its impact is transitory, and thus, losing its relevance in explaining abnormal returns 
at the close of the ex-dividend day. In addition, we show that, as reasonably predicted by 
Dubofsky (1992), active trading volume and the institutional framework that 
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characterizes the intensity with which professional market makers supply liquidity to the 
market do indeed accelerate the correction of the limit order bias intraday. 
Furthermore, this study is one of the very few that test microstructure effects using time 
stamped price and quote data over the entire course of ex-dividend day trading for U.S. 
common stocks.
1
 It is also the first study that investigates the impact of the open order 
adjustment at the ex-dividend day of NASDAQ listed stocks (NASDAQ Rule 3220), in 
parallel with NYSE and AMEX stocks, for which the exchange rules (NYSE Rule 118 
and AMEX Rule 132) regarding the dividend adjustment are essentially the same. 
Several studies deployed the cum-day close to ex-day open rather than the cum-day close 
to ex-day close price drops in their pursuit of confirming the validity of alternative 
hypotheses in explaining the ex-day anomaly, on the grounds that overnight price drops 
are less noisy, thereby, producing more robust results (Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003), and Jakob and Ma (2004)). In relation to 
this, our empirical results imply that this is not advisable, as the price drops at the ex-day 
opening are due to be afflicted with the open limit order bias. Nevertheless, price drops 
calculated at the ex-day close are not equally affected and thus, provide safer 
methodological ground for future research in what drives the ex-day price drop 
discrepancy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related 
literature on microstructure effects present on the ex-dividend day and states the 
                                                          
1
 To the best of our knowledge, the only other study that employs high frequency ex-day data is made by 
Balasubramaniam et al. (2010) who perform an intraday analysis of ex-dividend days collected from the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ under different tax and price quotation regimes over the period from 1994 to 
2003.  
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hypotheses that will be empirically investigated. Section 3 lays out the institutional 
framework applicable to this study, the methodology employed to compute relevant 
variables, the sample selection and filters applied to the data. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results in the context of testing the stated hypotheses and Section 5 concludes 
the study. 
 
2. Review of the Literature and Development of the Hypotheses 
2.1 Review of the Literature 
Within the microstructure framework, the “tick size hypothesis” introduced by Bali and 
Hite (1998) and the “limit order adjustment hypothesis” introduced by Dubofsky (1992) 
directly challenged the tax hypothesis proposed by the widely cited study of Elton and 
Gruber (1970) in the context of identifying the main driver of the positive abnormal 
returns apparent on the ex-dividend day of U.S. common stocks.
2
 
Bali and Hite (1998) examined a sample of taxable distributions made by stocks listed at 
NYSE and AMEX for the period from July 2, 1962 until December 31, 1994 during 
which the tick size was equal to 12.5 cents. They argued that whenever the dividend is an 
inexact multiple of the regulatory tick size, the stock price drop will be systematically 
rounded downwards, on the grounds that no investor would be willing to pay more than 
the dividend amount (in terms of ex-day capital losses) to “buy” the dividend. 
Nonetheless, Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003), and Jakob and Ma (2004) who 
                                                          
2
 Another microstructure hypothesis that competes with these two in explaining the ex-dividend day 
anomaly is the “bid-ask bounce” tested by Frank and Jagannathan (1998) on a sample of stocks listed in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxable.     
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tested the “tick size hypothesis” with extensive ex-day samples of NYSE stocks spanning 
through periods of three distinct tick size regimes, provided no support for Bali and 
Hite’s (1998) predictions.   
On the other hand, Dubofsky (1992) proposed the “limit order adjustment hypothesis” as 
an explanation for the ex-dividend day anomaly prevalent in U.S. common stocks, which 
is based on how NYSE Rule 118 and AMEX Rule 132 dictate how previously placed 
(“good-till-canceled”) limit orders to buy and sell stock are handled on ex-days. On both 
exchanges, open limit orders to buy a stock (at the bid) must be reduced by the cash 
dividend amount at the opening of the ex-dividend day. Moreover, in case the adjusted 
limit buy order price is not a multiple of the tick size, (equal to $1/8 over Dubofsky’s 
(1992) period examined), it is further reduced to the next lower tick. On the other hand, 
limit orders to sell (at the ask) are not consistently reduced by the ex-cash dividend 
amount.
3
 The author argued that, the asymmetric adjustment of open limit orders on ex-
days under the NYSE and AMEX rules is sufficient to create ex-day abnormal returns 
under three assumptions: (i) the cum-dividend day closing price is the mean of the best 
bid and ask quotes specified by open good-till-canceled buy and sell limit orders, 
                                                          
3
 As pointed out by Jakob and Ma (2005), even if there were no adjustment at either limit orders to buy or 
limit orders to sell at the ex-dividend day opening, investors who place limit buy orders at the bid have 
greater incentives to adjust their orders for the dividend than investors who place limit sell orders at the ask. 
This is because on the bid side, limit order traders would prefer to buy at the lower adjusted price whereas 
on the ask side limit order traders would not voluntarily pursue to sell their stocks at a price reduced by the 
dividend amount, although such an initiative would result in the fair valuation of the stock price on the ex-
dividend day. In this context, one would reasonably wonder why the NYSE and AMEX exchanges 
mechanically adjust the open ex-day prices in a direction in which limit order investors should be 
inherently inclined to do in the first place. One plausible explanation for this is that the stock exchange 
regulators assume that investors placing market orders are more likely to be aware of the deprivation of the 
right to the dividend at the ex-day than investors who have placed “good-till-canceled” limit orders to sell 
or buy before the ex-day. In this respect, limit order investors would be protected from buying the stock at 
the ex-dividend day at a price higher than one that is fairly reduced by the dividend amount, whereas 
market order investors would only buy the stock at the adjusted fair price, thereby forcing stale limit sell 
orders remained at the order book overnight to be canceled or adjusted downward for as to be executed. 
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respectively (ii) on the ex-dividend day close, the best bid and ask quotes are those of the 
outstanding limit orders previously placed by investors during the cum-dividend period 
and adjusted as specified by the aforementioned NYSE and AMEX rules and (iii) the 
opening or closing trade on the ex-day is executed at one of these two quotes, with equal 
probabilities. 
As correctly pinpointed by Jakob and Ma (2004), Dubofsky’s (1992) model explicitly 
specifies that the ex-day price drop must be equal to one half of the dividend amount 
rounded though upwards whenever this falls in between ticks. At the same time, the bid-
ask spread is due to widen at the ex-day open since the ask quotes of open limit order to 
sell will not follow the adjustment of the bid quotes of open limit order to buy. Jakob and 
Ma’s (2004) results provided support for Dubofsky’s (1992) model since they found ex-
day dollar price drops measured with bid quotes to be consistently higher than price drops 
measured with ask quotes, and also bid-ask spread to significantly increase, in particular 
at the ex-day open, across three different tick size regimes. Moreover, Jakob and Ma 
(2005), who investigated the ex-day anomaly for stocks in the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) where there is no adjustment mechanism for open limit orders, nominate the “limit 
order adjustment hypothesis” as the only, among the tax hypothesis (Elton and Gruber 
(1970), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2005)), the transaction cost hypothesis (Kalay 1982) 
and the other abovementioned microstructure hypotheses, that could explain the 
Canadian ex-day puzzle. 
According to the empirical results presented by Dubofsky (1992), support for his model 
was only provided by samples of stocks paying small dividends given that abnormal 
returns at the ex-day close for high dividend yield stocks were found to be statistically 
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insignificant on average. The author attributed this result to the active trading and 
specialist intervention taking place for high dividend yield stocks, by which intraday 
quotes from unadjusted orders to sell are revised towards the fully adjusted price, thereby 
correcting for the abnormal returns evident at the ex-day open.
4
  
 
2.2 Hypotheses  
The most straightforward inference made by Dubofsky’s (1992) model is that the bid-ask 
spread will substantially increase from cum-day close to ex-day open, which is confirmed 
by the empirical results of Jakob and Ma (2004, 2005). A starting point for this study 
would be to attempt to endorse such an argument by identifying the positive return bias 
expected due to the increase of the bid-ask spread at the opening of the ex-dividend day: 
Hypothesis 1: Due to the significant bid-ask spread increase at the opening of NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ caused by the asymmetric dividend adjustment of open limit 
buy/sell orders, a positive return bias will be present at the ex-day opening. 
In addition, Dubofsky (1992) hypothesized that active ex-day trading supported by 
greater specialist intervention will minimize the likelihood that the bias incurred by the 
asymmetrical limit order adjustment at the ex-day open will have any impact on closing 
prices. In this context, the high frequency nature of our data provides us with a unique 
opportunity to examine whether the open order bias diminishes in the course of intraday 
trading:  
                                                          
4
 Furthermore, Dubofsky (1992) argued that the specialists’ intervention during the ex-dividend day is 
expected to be substantial compared to a normal trading day as short-term traders and low-taxed, long-term 
investors engaging in dividend capturing are envisaged to sell their stock holdings in order to cash the 
accrued profit from their trading strategies. 
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Hypothesis 2: As active trading takes place during the ex-day, new limit orders entered 
and market orders executed at prices that effectively reflect the dividend adjustment, the 
open order bias evident at the ex-day opening is expected to be corrected before the 
closing of the ex-dividend day. 
Naturally, the open order bias should be the main factor contributing to the ex-dividend 
anomaly, as measured by the price drop ratio (PDR) or the abnormal returns (AR
ex
) 
calculated at the ex-dividend day open. At the same time, to the extent that the positive 
return bias at the open is reversed before the close of the ex-day, it should also cease to 
affect the valuation of the dividend at the ex-day close. These predictions are briefly 
summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The ex-day price drop discrepancy, as measured by the overnight PDR and 
AR
ex
 (estimated with opening ex-day prices), should be significantly associated to the 
open order bias. Nevertheless, the intraday correction of the ex-day open order bias will 
render PDR and AR
ex
 at the ex-day close unaffected by the transitory impact of the 
asymmetric dividend adjustment of open limit buy/sell orders. 
Dubofsky (1992) commented that, most likely, the abnormal returns created by the limit 
order exchange rules at the ex-day open will persist until the ex-day close, primarily in 
samples of low-yielding, thinly traded stocks. In relation to this, Jakob and Ma (2005) 
formally tested whether higher trading volumes, dividend dollar amounts or dividend 
yields have any power in reducing the abnormal returns generated by the asymmetrical 
limit order adjustment. They found that it is only trading volume created by active trading 
during the ex-dividend day that significantly reduces the ex-day abnormal returns. 
Thereby, Hypothesis 4 associates the speed of the correction of the open order bias at the 
9 
 
ex-day open with the volumes of trades executed during the ex-day trading session, as 
follows:      
Hypothesis 4: Intraday trading volume, which represents the intensity with which 
investors update their quoted prices to adjust trades for the omission of the dividend on 
the ex-day, will contribute to a faster reversal of the bid-ask spread widening incurred at 
the ex-day opening.   
Finally, Dubofsky (1992) makes special mention to the designated exchange’s specialists 
who will satisfy market orders with the view to reducing the bid-ask spread in the context 
of their duty in maintaining an orderly and liquid market. The effectiveness of 
professional market makers in accelerating the narrowing of the bid-ask spread, which is 
expanded at the ex-day open, will most likely be determined by the distinct institutional 
characteristics of each exchange, as hypothesized below: 
Hypothesis 5: The speed of the narrowing of the bid-ask spread is expected to be higher 
in the exchange where professional market makers intensely compete to provide liquidity 
to the market.  
Next, we move to a brief description of the institutional framework, which provides the 
main ground for the empirical analysis that will follow.  
 
3. Institutional Framework, Data and Methodology 
3.1 NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ Institutional Framework 
NYSE is an order driven market where each stock is assigned a designated specialist who 
oversees the consolidated order book for all the stock’s orders routed to the exchange’s 
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floor. At the opening and closing of the trading day, the specialist monitors a call auction 
by which any orders standing in the order book are matched on the basis of the 
exchange’s order precedence rules and executed at a single market clearing price. 
Between the open and close, placed orders are executed, if marketable, or remain in the 
order book, if not, on a continuous basis. The exchange rules also require the specialist to 
promote a "fair and orderly market” by posting bid and ask quotes with the view to 
mitigating potential order flow imbalances.
5
  
On the other hand, NASDAQ constitutes a computerized quote driven market where the 
order flow for a specific stock is allocated to many dealers who maintain their own 
separate order book but compete with each other via the continuous notification of their 
bid and ask quotes to other traders. The dealers are obliged to include limit orders placed 
by other investors in their books against which marketable orders can trade in priority. At 
the opening (closing) of the trading day, NASDAQ operates consolidated order crossing 
facilities by which all on-open (on-close) orders and standing orders from the continuous 
order book are brought together, matched and executed at a single price. Furthermore, 
interdealer markets exist to enable dealers arrange trades among themselves, in particular, 
in the course of minimizing their stock inventory accumulation. Overall, NASDAQ 
dealers are assumed to have a greater discretion in choosing their trading counterparts 
whereas NYSE specialists are envisaged to own a unique informational advantage over 
other traders provided by the knowledge of the entire order flow for a particular stock at 
any time.  
                                                          
5
 Since the acquisition of AMEX by NYSE Euronext in October 2008, which represents a family of 
exchanges including, inter alia, the NYSE and Euronext equity markets, the existing AMEX market 
systems were transitioned to the NYSE Euronext technology under which the NYSE also operates. 
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Regarding the adjustment of dividends on the ex-dividend day, the treatment is quite 
uniform for all three exchanges. According to NYSE Rule 118 and AMEX Rule 132, 
when a security is quoted ex-dividend, any limit orders to buy that are still active at the 
opening of the ex-dividend day shall be automatically reduced by the amount of the cash 
dividend whereas any open limit orders to sell shall not do so. Alike, according to 
NASDAQ Rule 3220, any dealer holding an open limit order to buy from a customer or 
another broker/dealer shall, prior to executing the order, reduce the order price by the 
amount of the cash dividend.
6
 On the other hand, open limit orders to sell are not 
symmetrically adjusted for the dividend at the ex-day open in NASDAQ.   
Finally, over the examined period, the minimum price variation (tick size) is $0.01 for 
securities with prices greater or equal than $1.00 and $0.0001 for securities with prices 
less than $1.00, in both NYSE and NASDAQ. In AMEX, the tick size is equal to $0.01 
for all price ranges of securities.
7
 As a result, given that all examined markets are fully 
decimalized, we presume that no tick size effects will be posing any material disturbance 
to the pricing of the ex-dividend day.
8
 
 
3.2 Data Sample Construction and Filtering 
The examined sample contains all cash dividends distributed by U.S. common stocks that 
are primarily listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the period from the 21
st
 of 
                                                          
6
 For relevant excerpts from the exchange rulebooks regarding the open order price adjustment on the ex-
dividend day of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, see Appendix A-3.1. 
7
 For relevant exchange rules regarding minimum price variations in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, see 
Appendix A-3.2. 
8
 In particular, the tick size effects described in the studies made by Dubofsky (1992), Bali and Hite (1998), 
and Jakob and Ma (2005), which mainly examined periods when markets were not fully decimalized, are 
assumed not to have a significant impact on our tested samples.  
12 
 
October 2010 until the 31
st
 of December 2011. The final dataset is assembled through a 
stepwise match of data retrieved from Bloomberg, whereby each cash dividend is merged 
with daily price, quote and volume data on the ex-dividend day, which is subsequently 
merged with time stamped intra-ex-day price, quote and volume data extracted on a 
minute-by-minute frequency.
9
 Likewise, daily prices for the composite indices 
corresponding to NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (with Bloomberg codes: NYA, XAX and 
CCMP respectively) are merged with their minute-by-minute prices on the ex-dividend 
day, which are successively matched with the intra-ex-day prices of the common stock 
sample on the basis of the time stamp. 
The initial cash dividend sample comprises 7,318 cash dividends out of which 98.0% 
corresponds to regular dividends with the rest being mostly special dividends (1.8%) and 
return of capital (0.2%) cash distributions. Several screening filters are applied to the 
initial sample in order to mitigate the effect of non-complete data history, thin trading and 
outliers. First, we exclude dividends for which no closing trade price on the cum/ex-
dividend day or intra-day data was reported, the last time-stamped trade price is greater 
than $200 or less than $1 at the ex-dividend day close, or deviates by more than $0.3 
from the daily closing price. Next, dividends with less than or equal to only five traded 
minutes during the ex-day and those distributed by NYSE and AMEX stocks on the 27
th
 
of May 2011 for which date Bloomberg did not report index intra-day data for the 
corresponding indices were also deleted from the sample. In total, 1,269 (17.3% of the 
initial sample) are filtered out resulting in a “clean” sample of 6,049 observations, as 
                                                          
9 More specifically, the minute-by-minute prices, bid quotes and ask quotes refer to last trade that took place within 
each consecutive minute during the ex-dividend day whereas the minute-by-minute volume figures refer to the total 
volume of all trades carried out within each consecutive minute. 
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illustrated in Table 1. Finally, after calculating the PDR and AR
ex
 (both being described 
in the following section), at both the opening and closing of the ex-dividend day, we 
perform and upper and lower 2.5% quantile trim on the basis of the closing PDR and 
AR
ex
 distributions to control for extreme values.
10
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.3 Methodology 
At the ex-dividend day open, the bid-ask spread is envisaged to increase relative to the 
one existing at the cum-dividend close due to the asymmetrical adjustment of the limit 
orders still open at the ex-day opening.  In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we need to 
quantify the impact of the limit order adjustment rules of the exchanges on the pricing of 
stocks at the opening of the ex-dividend day. For this reason, we employ the order flow 
bias as computed by Conrad and Conroy (1994), which is due to measure the expected 
change of the bid-ask spread in combination with the tendency of a stock to close at the 
ask price due to the execution of a buy trade. We opt for the order flow bias measure 
rather than just the change of the bid-ask spread because the effect of the non-adjustment 
of open limit order to sell will be evidently recorded at the opening price of the ex-
dividend day insofar as it is combined with a high probability of the opening trades to 
take place at the ask side.  
Following Conrad and Conroy’s (1994) methodology, the ex-dividend day trade returns 
are decomposed into bid returns and order flow effects occurring at the ex-dividend day. 
                                                          
10
 The 2.5% upper and lower quantile trim follows Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003), with the 
difference that this study’s PDR and ARex samples are separately trimmed on the grounds that their 
distributions do not share the same outliers. 
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More specifically, the intraday trade return (TRim) at each minute m of an i ex-dividend 
day for a particular stock can be approximated by the sum of the bid return (BRim) and the 
order flow bias (OFbiasim), which captures the change of the proportional bid-ask spread 
(BASim) and the change of the within spread location of the trade (Locim) from one minute 
to the other.
11
 In particular,  
 1
1
*100% (1)
im im
im im im
im
P P
TR BR OFbias
P




 
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im im
im
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 
 
 
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im im
im im im
P B A B
Loc BAS
A B B
 
 
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where Pim, Bim and Aim are the price of the closing trade, best bid quote and best ask 
quote, respectively, at each minute m of an i ex-dividend day for a particular stock. Loc 
ranges from zero to one and reflects the probability that the trade will be executed at the 
ask price. In specific, a mean Loc value above 0.5 indicates the tendency of the trade to 
take place at the ask whereas a mean Loc value below 0.5 indicates the tendency of the 
trade to take place at the bid. 
Hypothesis 3 explicitly associates the asymmetric adjustment of open limit buy/sell 
orders at the opening of the ex-dividend day with the price drop anomaly widely 
                                                          
11
 According to Conrad and Conroy (1994), the approximation of the trade return holds for small values of 
(Locim*BASim). For a simplified proof of the approximation, see Appendix A-4. 
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documented in the ex-day literature. To measure the ex-day discrepancy, we calculate the 
standard metrics employed in the ex-dividend day bibliography, namely, the Price Drop 
Ratio (PDRi) and the ex-day Abnormal Return (ARi
ex
) both adjusted for the market return 
as follows: 
1
(6), (7)
ex
cum i
i
index ex cum
ex indexi i i
i i cum
i i
P
P
R P P D
PDR AR R
D P
 
 
        
where Pi
cum
 is the closing daily price on the i cum-dividend day for a particular stock, Pi
ex
 
is the price of the last trade at the closing/opening minute of an i ex-dividend day for a 
particular stock, Di is the amount of the dividend corresponding to the i ex-dividend day 
for a particular stock, and Ri
index
 is the contemporaneous ex-day return of the respective 
index of each exchange, namely NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The PDR and AR
ex
 are 
calculated both at the opening, where the limit order adjustment will mostly have an 
effect on the stock price, and the closing of the ex-dividend day. In theory, if the ex-
dividend day opening trade takes place at the fully adjusted bid price, Loc will be zero 
and the ex-day price drop will be equal to the dividend. Correspondingly, if the ex-
dividend day opening trade takes place at the non-adjusted ask price, Loc will be one and 
the ex-day price will not drop. In alignment with Dubofsky’s (1992) theoretical 
framework, if the opening trade, takes place at the ask or bid price with an equal 
probability on average across the sample, the mean Loc will be 0.5 and the average ex-
day price drop will be equal to one half of the dividend amount.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Graphs 
This section presents descriptive statistics for the general characteristics of the sampled 
stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, the intraday pattern of their trading 
volume throughout the ex-dividend day and finally, the PDR and AR
ex
 distributions 
derived from the 95% trimmed samples. 
First, Table 2 presents summary statistics for the dividends and trading activity of 
common stocks together for NYSE and AMEX, and separately for NASDAQ, on the 
basis of the 95% trimmed PDR sample. The mean dividend amount and dividend yield 
paid by NYSE & AMEX stocks is $0.236 and 0.698% respectively. On the other hand, 
although NASDAQ stocks distribute a smaller average dividend amount of $0.181 than 
NYSE and AMEX stocks, they offer a higher mean dividend yield equal to 0.956% 
because they are relatively low priced compared to their NYSE and AMEX counterparts 
(mean stock price at the cum-dividend day close approximately equal to $24 for 
NASDAQ while close to $38 for NYSE and AMEX). Furthermore, the average stock 
listed on NYSE and AMEX is more liquid than the average NASDAQ stock as it reports 
a total daily volume of 566,383 shares and a volume of 1,668 shares traded every minute 
on average during its ex-day (compared to 353,696 shares and 1,236 shares of total and 
minute average ex-day volume, respectively, for NASDAQ stocks). The same 
conclusions are drawn from the respective median values, reported in Panel B of Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 here 
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Prior microstructure literature (Jain and Joh (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), 
Gerety and Mulherin (1992), McInish and Wood (1990) and Chan, Christie and Schultz 
(1995)) has documented a U-shaped pattern for intraday trade volume for all major 
financial markets. We investigate whether such a pattern is also observed in particular at 
the ex-dividend day of U.S. common stocks. In this respect, trade volume per minute is 
expressed as a % of total ex-day volume which is subsequently averaged across ex-
dividend days for each minute. As depicted in Figure 1, trade volume peaks at the open 
and close whereas remains at stable low levels in the interim of the ex-dividend day, 
thereby confirming its U-shaped evolution for both the NYSE and AMEX stocks, and the 
NASDAQ stocks. The same intra-day pattern is recorded when trade volume per minute 
is alternatively expressed as a multiple of the ex-dividend day minute average trade 
volume, as illustrated in Figure A-5.1 of the Appendix. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Finally, descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 for the PDR and the AR
ex
 as 
computed either at the opening or the closing of the ex-day, separately for NYSE and 
AMEX stocks, and NASDAQ stocks, as well as for the group of all stocks listed on all 
exchanges. In addition, tests are performed on median and mean values to examine 
whether the sample PDR (AR
ex
) is equal to its theoretical value, namely, whether PDR is 
equal to one (AR
ex
 equal to zero).
12
  
                                                          
12
 All statistics have been calculated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles separately for the 
closing PDR and closing AR
ex
 samples. 
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For NYSE and AMEX stocks, the mean PDR at the open is 0.798 significantly lower 
than one at the 1% level (t-stat= 4.16) whereas the mean PDR at the close, equal to 
0.959, is higher than the one calculated at the open and not significantly different to one 
at the 10% level (t-stat= 0.67). The median PDR at the close, equal to 0.925 (z-stat= 
2.62) is also found higher than the median PDR at the open (0.866, z-stat= 8.38). 
Similarly, the mean and median AR
ex
 at the close, equal to 0.053% (t-stat= 2.48) and 
0.045% (z-stat= 2.50) respectively, are almost half of the mean and median AR
ex
 at the 
open equal to 0.101% (t-stat= 7.72) and 0.088% (z-stat= 9.31) respectively. 
For NASDAQ stocks, the mean PDR at the open, equal to 1.023 (t-stat= 0.37), is not 
significantly different to one at the 10% level but the median PDR at the open, equal to 
0.905 (z-stat= 3.15) is significantly different to one at the 1% level. On the other hand, 
the mean and median AR
ex
 at the open, equal to 0.049% (t-stat= 2.48) and 0.058% (z-
stat= 3.65) respectively, and the mean and median AR
ex
 at the close, equal to 0.092% (t-
stat= 2.74) and 0.076% (z-stat= 2.37) respectively, are all significantly different to zero at 
the 1% level.
13
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The fact that, for NYSE and AMEX stocks, the PDR at the close is higher than the PDR 
at the open and, likewise, the AR
ex
 at the close is lower than the AR
ex
 at the open 
provides preliminary evidence that the order flow bias assumed to create the ex-day 
                                                          
13
 The mean PDR and AR
ex
 calculated using the daily open and close trade prices differ immaterially from 
the ones presented here, which are computed with the trading prices of the opening or closing minute of the 
ex-dividend day. 
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anomaly at the open is somehow corrected, thereby leading to higher (lower) PDR (AR
ex
) 
values at the close.
14
 The same evidence of higher PDR and lower AR
ex
 values at the 
close versus the open of the ex-day is also obtained in the aggregate sample that contains 
the stocks from all three exchanges. 
 
4.2 Limit Order Adjustment and Order Flow Bias 
Jakob and Ma (2005) find evidence of a substantial widening of the bid-ask spread from 
cum-day close to ex-day open at the ex-dividend day of stocks listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange despite the fact that both the ask quote and bid quote are not 
mechanically adjusted by the dividend amount on the basis of the exchange’s rule. In 
relation to Hypothesis 1, we investigate the possibility of a widening and subsequent 
narrowing of the bid-ask spread during the ex-dividend day of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks by graphing the evolution of their relative trade price, ask quote and bid 
quote averaged over 15 minute intervals during the ex-dividend day. The relative trade 
price is the ratio of (P
ex,m
/P
cum
) where P
ex,m
 is the intra-day trade price at each m minute 
during the ex-dividend day and P
cum
 is the closing trade price at the cum-dividend day. 
The relative ask quote is the ratio of (A
ex,m
/A
cum
) where A
ex,m
 is the intra-day best ask 
quote at each m minute during the ex-dividend day and A
cum
 is the best ask quote at the 
cum-dividend day close. The relative bid quote is the ratio of (B
ex,m
/B
cum
) where B
ex,m
 is 
the intra-day best bid quote at each m minute during the ex-dividend day and B
cum
 is the 
best bid quote at the cum-dividend day close. The minute-by-minute relative trade price, 
                                                          
14
 A similar conclusion cannot be drawn for the PDR and AR
ex
 values of the NASDAQ sample. 
Nevertheless, due to its relatively small size, we consider its means and medians as less robust than the 
ones of the NYSE and AMEX.   
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ask quote and bid quote are first averaged over 15 minute intervals during each ex-
dividend day, and the 15 minute averages of the relative trade price, ask quote and bid 
quote are subsequently averaged across the sample of ex-dividend days.
15
   
According to Figure 2, for the NYSE and AMEX stocks, the magnitude of the drop of the 
ask quote does not follow that of the drop of the bid quote at the opening of the ex-
dividend day resulting in a substantial widening of the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, the 
extended opening bid-ask spread seems to narrow quickly in the first 30 minutes of the 
ex-day trading session and eventually falls to its lowest intra-day level at the closure of 
the market.  
For the NASDAQ stocks, a similar pattern is evident with two distinct features in 
comparison to the NYSE and AMEX stocks; the narrowing of the bid-ask spread is more 
rapid as it takes place within a few minutes from the ex-day opening while at the ex-day 
close it is again abruptly widened to a higher than its prior intra-day level.
16
 The same 
conclusions are drawn when, instead of the means, the cross sectional medians of the 
relative trade price, ask quote and bid quote are computed for each 15 minute interval as 
depicted in the Appendix, Figure A-5.2. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
                                                          
15
 More precisely, given the particular focus of this study on the opening of the ex-day, the first relative 
trade and quote values are calculated at the opening minute, that is, 9:30 a.m,, the second ones refer to the 
interval from 9:31 a.m. to 9:35 a.m., the third ones refer to the interval from 9:36 a.m. to 9:45 a.m., while 
the fourth (i.e. 9:46 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.) and all subsequent intervals are 15 minute intervals. In total, means 
are calculated for 28 intervals until the close of the ex-dividend day.   
16
 Brock and Kleidon (1992), McInish and Wood (1992), and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) found 
evidence of a U-shaped intraday pattern for the bid-ask spread for NYSE stocks, where spreads are widest 
immediately after the open and immediately preceding the close. Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) on the 
other hand, found that spreads are relatively stable during the trading session but narrow quickly near the 
close for NASDAQ stocks. 
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On the basis of the definition of the order flow bias (Equation 3), it is reasonable to 
assume that its evolution will be driven by the change of the bid-ask spread during the ex-
dividend day. In this respect, the evidence provided by the graphs illustrated in Figure 2 
is expected to also be confirmed by formal statistical tests on the order flow bias. In 
specific, the order flow bias is hypothesized to be significantly positive at the ex-day 
open (Hypotheses 1) and significantly negative during the ex-day trading session 
(Hypotheses 2) for both NYSE and AMEX, and NASDAQ samples. Furthermore, as 
indicated by Figure 2, the order flow bias in particular for the NASDAQ sample is 
anticipated to be significantly positive again at the ex-dividend day close.  
Table 4 presents the breakdown of the mean total return (TR) into the mean bid return 
(BR) and the mean order flow bias (OFbias), at the opening, at the closing and in the 
interim minutes of the ex-dividend day, separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks and 
NASDAQ stocks, as well as for all stocks listed on all exchanges. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, the mean order flow bias at the ex-day open of the NYSE and AMEX 
sample is equal to 0.19%, which is significantly positive at the 1% significance level (t-
statistic= 27.48). Similarly, the mean order flow bias at the ex-day open of the NASDAQ 
sample is equal to 0.62%, which is also significantly positive at the 1% significance level 
(t-statistic= 21.43). 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
In addition, in agreement with Hypothesis 2, the positive order flow bias existing at the 
ex-day open is almost fully reversed before the ex-day close, as active intra-day trading 
will pertain to new limit and market orders executed at prices that fully reflect the 
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dividend adjustment. For the NYSE and AMEX sample, the interim cumulative order 
flow bias and the order flow bias at the ex-day close are -0.18% and -0.01%, the 
aggregate of which entirely offsets the high positive order flow bias incurred at the ex-
day open. As a result, the cum-day close to ex-day close cumulative order flow bias is not 
significantly different to zero (t-statistic= 0.87), thereby confirming the full correction of 
the opening order flow bias. 
For the NASDAQ sample, although the interim cumulative order flow bias is -0.59%, 
hence, indicating a significant reversal of the positive order flow bias at the open, the 
minute order flow bias at the close rises to 0.56% due to the sudden increase of the bid-
ask spread at the last minute of the trading session illustrated in Figure 2. Overall, we find 
evidence that the positive order bias evident at the ex-day open is in fact reversed before 
the closing of the trading day in all examined exchanges, which is in alignment with 
Hypothesis 2. As a robustness test, we replicated Table 4 using medians rather than 
means. Median values for TR, BR and OFbias presented in Table A-5.2 of the Appendix 
provide similar conclusions in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
4.3 Impact of the Limit Order Adjustment on the Ex-Dividend Day Price Drop 
Hypothesis 3 states that although the positive order flow bias evident at the ex-dividend 
day opening is expected to have a significant explanatory power on the PDR/AR
ex
 
computed with opening trading prices, this will not be the case when PDR/AR
ex
 is 
calculated at the ex-day close. To perform a direct test on Hypothesis 3, the PDR/AR
ex
 of 
the 95% trimmed samples are regressed against the OFbias, a group of control variables 
that capture other microstructure effects on the ex-day, and the dividend yield which 
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constitutes the explanatory variable most widely used in the ex-dividend bibliography. 
Accordingly, the regression equation that is estimated with the method of OLS
17
 takes the 
following form: 
1 2 3 4 5/ (8)
ex open
it it i it it it i itPDR AR OFbias BAS Loc TVol DY              
where, OFbias
open
 is the order flow bias at the opening of the i ex-dividend day for a 
particular stock, BAS is the proportional bid-ask spread, Loc is the within spread location 
of the trade, TVol is the natural logarithm of the trading volume over the relevant minute, 
and DY is the stock dividend yield equal to the dividend amount over the closing price on 
the cum-day. The subscript t refers to the time when the regression model is estimated, 
namely to either the opening or the closing of the ex-dividend day. Finally, all 
microstructure explanatory variables, namely, OFbias
open
, BAS, Loc and TVol, are 
orthogonalized before Equation 8 is estimated to account for implicit collinearity incurred 
due to the contemporaneous nature of these regressors.  
According to Hypothesis 3, when regressing PDR (AR
ex
), β1 is predicted to be 
significantly negative (positive) at the ex-day opening when the asymmetrical limit order 
adjustment is due to hinder the full price drop. In contrast, it is expected to be found 
insignificantly different to zero at the ex-day closing by which time the opening order 
flow bias is envisaged to be already corrected. Table 5 presents the empirical results for 
the set of estimations of Equation 8 at the open and close of the ex-dividend day 
performed separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks, and for NASDAQ stocks. As 
reported in Panel A, the OFbias is negatively associated with the open PDR at the 1% 
                                                          
17
 The t-statistics of the estimated OLS coefficients are computed with heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors, according to the White (1980) correction. 
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significance level, whereas it becomes insignificant when the PDR is calculated at the 
close. Similarly, Panel B shows that the OFbias is positively related to the AR
ex
 at the 
open at the 1% significance level but again, it is insignificant in relation to the AR
ex
 at the 
close. Estimation results are consistent when the NYSE and AMEX sample and the 
NASDAQ sample are either tested separately or together, thereby providing support for 
Hypothesis 3, which predicts that OFbias will lose its explanatory power over the ex-day 
price drop anomaly towards the close of the ex-dividend day. 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Furthermore, Loc constitutes the only regressor which seems to significantly influence 
the ex-day close dividend valuation at the 5% (1%) level for the NYSE and AMEX 
(NASDAQ) sample. More specifically, the higher the probability that the stock price will 
close at the ask, the lower (higher) the ex-day close PDR (AR
ex
) will be, thus implying 
that microstructure effects, other than the open limit order adjustment, remain important 
for the explanation of the ex-day price drop discrepancy.
18
   
 
4.4 Factors Contributing to the Speed of the Limit Order Bias Correction 
In the discussion of his results, Dubofsky (1992) named the active trading volume and 
professional market makers’ intervention as two of the factors which would most likely 
contribute to the fast correction of the open limit order bias, without though performing 
                                                          
18
 As a robustness test, we repeated all estimations illustrated in Table 5 after omitting the 
orthogonalization of regressors. Estimated coefficient signs and significance levels presented in Table A-
5.3 of the Appendix do not materially differ from the ones reported here. 
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any direct test on the basis of these predictions. In an attempt to fill this gap, we examine 
whether the speed of the correction of the limit order bias can be indeed associated with 
the ex-day trading volume or the distinct exchange characteristics that determine the 
intensity with which professional market makers assist in the fair reflection of the 
dividend adjustment into stock prices.  
Hypothesis 4 associates the speed of the intraday correction of the BAS widening 
incurred at the ex-day opening with the volume of trades executed during the ex-day 
trading session. In order to test this hypothesis, we first define the first minute in which 
the cumulative percentage change of the BAS from the cum-day close becomes equal to 
or less than zero as the assumed point in time when the full reversal of the BAS widening 
has been achieved. Next, we group ex-days on the basis of the minute within which the 
BAS widening is fully reversed, over the interval from the ex-day open until 10:00 a.m., 
during which period the majority of the sample reports a reversal of the BAS widening. 
Finally, for each group of ex-days, we calculate the cross-sectional median of the average 
trading volume recorded over their entire ex-dividend day and thus, graph the computed 
median values against each minute within which the reversals of the BAS widening have 
materialized, separately for the NYSE and AMEX sample, and the NASDAQ sample.
19
 
As demonstrated in Figure 3, ex-days for which the open BAS widening is reversed 
immediately after the ex-day open are the ones with the highest reported average intraday 
volume during the ex-dividend day. On the basis of the downward sloping curve of the 
graph, we deduce that the smaller the ex-day trading activity for a particular stock the 
longer it will take for the reversal of the BAS widening incurred at the ex-day open. This 
                                                          
19
 Due to the small size of the minute-by-minute ex-day samples constructed for the purpose of plotting 
figure 3, means are particularly affected by trade volume outliers and therefore, they are not reported.   
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conclusion is derived for both the NYSE and AMEX, and NASDAQ samples, thereby 
providing support for Hypothesis 4.   
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
Stoll and Whaley’s (1990) and Brock and Kleidon’s (1992) models associated the 
widening of BAS for NYSE stocks with the exchange’s specialists market power and 
control of the aggregate order book. The main implication of these models is that the 
dissimilar institutional characteristics of different markets are expected to have a material 
impact on the evolution of bid-ask spreads during the trading day. In this context, Chan, 
Christie and Schultz (1995) found that NASDAQ stocks are characterized by a narrower 
BAS than NYSE stocks towards their trading close and attributed their result, again, to 
the lack of market power over order flow among the various dealers operating in 
NASDAQ. On the basis of such contention, we would expect differences with regards to 
the speed of reversal of the bid-ask spread increase evident at the ex-day opening 
between NYSE and AMEX stocks, and NASDAQ stocks.  
Hypothesis 5 implies that the widened BAS at the ex-day open is anticipated to narrow 
more quickly in NASDAQ, where professional dealers intensely compete for order flow 
in the market, than in NYSE and AMEX stocks, where the single specialist assigned to 
each stock has greater control on the spread determination. Figure 4 depicts the evolution 
of cross-sectional means and medians of the BAS which is first averaged over 15 minute 
intervals for each stock. Is it evident that the decline of the BAS after the ex-day open is 
more abrupt for the NASDAQ sample but relatively slower for the NYSE and AMEX 
sample. In unreported analysis, we found that, from the ex-day open until 9:35 a.m., the 
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mean BAS for the NASDAQ sample has decreased by -52% (from 1.67% to 0.80%) 
whereas for the NYSE and AMEX sample, its reduction over the same interval, is only    
-27% (from 0.47% to 0.34%). Moreover, from the ex-day open until 9:44 a.m., the mean 
BAS percentage reduction is equal to -60% for the NASDAQ sample versus -42% for the 
NYSE and AMEX sample, thereby, providing evidence in favor of the Hypothesis 5. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
 5. Conclusion 
This study is motivated by Dufosky’s (1992) model which concludes that the asymmetric 
adjustment of open limit orders for cash dividend payments under the NYSE and AMEX 
rules is sufficient to create abnormal returns on the ex-dividend day. In this study, we 
investigate the power of such prediction by using minute-by-minute trade and quote data 
recorded during the ex-dividend days of common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ over the period from the 21
st
 of October 2010 until the 31
st
 of December 2011. 
In this context, we deploy Conrad and Conroy’s (1994) order flow bias metric to proxy 
for the impact of the asymmetric limit order adjustment at the opening of the ex-dividend 
day.  
The order flow bias, which encompasses the anticipated widening of the bid-ask spread at 
the opening of the ex-dividend day, is found to dominate the overnight returns but at the 
same time, is significantly corrected before the close of the ex-dividend day. As a result, 
the significant association of the ex-day price drop discrepancy with the opening order 
flow bias disappears at the ex-dividend day close. Finally, empirical evidence shows that 
28 
 
the reversal of the bid-ask spread widening, which constitutes the main component of the 
order flow bias, at the ex-day open, is in fact quicker in stocks which are more liquid or 
listed on NASDAQ where strong competition among dealers is envisaged to drive stale 
quotes closer to the fair adjustment of the dividend. 
In a nutshell, this study concludes that Dufosky’s (1992) limit order adjustment 
hypothesis has indeed evidenced explanatory power for the price drop discrepancy 
evident at the ex-day open, which nonetheless fades out, via active trading, before the ex-
day close. 
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Figure 1 
Intra Ex-Dividend Day Evolution of Trade Volume: 
As a % of Ex-day Total Trade Volume 
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of trade volume over minute intervals during the ex-dividend day 
separately for stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX and stocks listed on the NASDAQ. Trade volume per 
minute is expressed as a % of total trade ex-day volume which is subsequently averaged across the sample 
of ex-dividend days for each minute. 
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Figure 2 
Intra Ex-Dividend Day Evolution of the Relative Trade Price, Ask & Bid Quotes 
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of the relative trade price, ask quote and bid quote averaged over 15 
minute intervals during the ex-dividend day separately for stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX and 
stocks listed on the NASDAQ. The relative trade price is the ratio of (P
ex,m
/P
cum
) where P
ex,m
 is the intra-day 
trade price at each m minute during the ex-dividend day and P
cum
 is the closing trade price at the cum-
dividend day. The relative ask quote is the ratio of (A
ex,m
/A
cum
) where A
ex,m
 is the intra-day best ask quote 
at each m minute during the ex-dividend day and A
cum
 is the closing best ask quote at the cum-dividend 
day. The relative bid quote is the ratio of (B
ex,m
/B
cum
) where B
ex,m
 is the intra-day best bid quote at each m 
minute during the ex-dividend day and B
cum
 is the closing best bid quote at the cum-dividend day. The 
minute-by-minute relative trade price, ask quote and bid quote are first averaged over 15 minute intervals 
during each ex-dividend day, and the 15 minute averages of the relative trade price, ask quote and bid quote 
are subsequently averaged across the sample of ex-dividend days. 
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Figure 3 
Ex-day Minute Average Volume across Time  
of Full Bid-Ask Spread Increase Reversal  
 
This figure illustrates the median of the ex-day minute average volume across stocks that share the same 
point in time when the open bid-ask spread (BAS) widening is fully reversed over the interval from the ex-
dividend day open until 10:00 a.m. The reversal of the open BAS widening is assumed to take place within 
the minute in which the cumulative percentage change of the BAS from the cum-day close becomes equal 
to or less than zero for the first time during the ex-day. The ex-day minute average volume is defined as the 
average number of shares traded over one minute within the ex-dividend day for each stock. The medians 
of the ex-day minute average volume are plotted against each minute within which the reversals of the BAS 
widening have materialized, separately for the NYSE and AMEX sample, and the NASDAQ sample. 
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Figure 4 
Intra Ex-Dividend Day Evolution of the Bid-Ask Spread:  
NYSE and AMEX versus NASDAQ 
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of the percentage bid-ask spreads (BAS) averaged over 15 minute 
intervals during the ex-dividend day, separately for stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX, and stocks 
listed on the NASDAQ. The BAS is equal to [(A – B) / B] where B is the best bid quote and A is the best 
ask quote at the close of each minute over the ex-dividend day. The minute-by-minute BAS figures are first 
averaged over 15 minute intervals during each ex-dividend day, and subsequently the mean and median 
values of the 15 minute averages of the BAS are calculated across the sample of ex-dividend days. 
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Table 1 
Filters of Sample Screening Cash Dividends  
Distributed by NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ Common Stocks 
 
The initial sample consists of the Bloomberg history of cash dividends paid by common stocks primarily 
listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from October 21
st
, 2010 until December 31
st
, 2011. The initial 
sample size is reduced by the removal of dividends, for which a closing trade price on the cum/ex-dividend 
day or intra-day data during the ex-day were unavailable, whose last time-stamped trade price is greater 
than $200 or less than $1 at the ex-dividend day close, or deviates by more than $0.3 from the daily closing 
price, which report less than or equal to only five traded minutes during the ex-day, and which are 
distributed by NYSE and AMEX stocks on the 27
th
 of May 2011, on which date index intra-day data for the 
corresponding indices was unavailable. The second and third column of the table report the quantity of 
observations removed as a number and as a percentage of the initial sample size, respectively. In addition, 
in order to mitigate the outlier impact the PDR and the AR
ex
 total distributions are separately trimmed at 
the 2.5% upper and 2.5% lower tail. 
 
Filters and Trimming applied to the ex-day sample;  
21st October 2010 - 31st December 2011 
Removed 
Obs 
Removed 
% 
Residual 
Obs 
Ex-days for all cash dividends. 
  
7,318 
Exclude dividends for which no daily cum-day or ex-day trade price 
was available. 
488 6.7% 6,830 
Exclude ex-days for which no intra-day time-stamped data was 
retrieved. 
291 4.0% 6,539 
Exclude dividends for which the last time-stamped trade price on the 
ex-day is greater than $200 or less than $1. 
5 0.1% 6,534 
Exclude ex-days for which the last time-stamped trade price on the ex-
day is higher or lower than the daily closing price by more than $0.3. 
32 0.4% 6,502 
Exclude ex-days of thinly traded stocks (with less than or equal to five 
traded minutes within the ex-day). 
399 5.5% 6,103 
Exclude dividends going ex on the 27th of May 2011, for which no 
intra-day time-stamped data was retrieved for the NYSE & AMEX 
exchanges. 
54 0.7% 6,049 
Trim the 2.5% upper tail and 2.5% lower tail of the ex-day PDR/AR
ex
 
distribution of the total sample. 
326   5,723 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ Common Stocks 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the dividend yield (DY%), dividend amount (Div$), trade price 
at the close of the cum-dividend day (Price), daily trade volume (Vol(day)) and minute average trade 
volume (Vol(min)) on the ex-dividend day separately for stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX and stocks 
listed on the NASDAQ. Panel A reports means and Panel B reports medians on the basis of the 95% 
trimmed closing PDR sample.  
 
Panel A: Means Obs DY(%) Div($) Price Vol(day) Vol(min) 
NYSE & AMEX 3,738 0.698% 0.236 37.857 566,383 1,668 
NASDAQ 1,985 0.956% 0.181 24.090 353,696 1,236 
All Exchanges 5,723 0.787% 0.217 33.082 492,613 1,518 
              
Panel B: Medians Obs DY(%) Div($) Price Vol(day) Vol(min) 
NYSE & AMEX 3,738 0.548% 0.175 32.945 218,057 749 
NASDAQ 1,985 0.635% 0.120 18.690 38,530 429 
All Exchanges 5,723 0.578% 0.150 27.540 131,071 590 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for the PDR and AR
ex
  
At the Open and at the Close of the Ex-Dividend Day 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the price drop ratio (PDR) and the abnormal return (AR
ex
) as 
computed either at the opening or the closing of the ex-day, separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks and 
NASDAQ stocks, as well as for all stocks listed on all exchanges. In addition, t-statistics and z-statistics are 
reported for testing whether the sample mean and median values are equal to their theoretical values (PDR 
=1 and AR
ex
 =0). Means and medians have been calculated after trimming the top and bottom 2.5 
percentiles separately for the closing PDR and closing AR
ex 
samples. Panel A refers to PDR statistics while 
panel B refers to AR
ex
 statistics. The PDR is defined as [(P
cum
  (Pex/(1 + Rindex))) / Div] and the ARex is 
defined as [((P
ex
  Pcum  Div) / Pcum)  Rindex]. Pcum is the daily trade price at the closing of the cum-
dividend day, P
ex
 is the price of either the closing or opening trade of the ex-dividend day, and Div is the 
dividend amount. Both PDR and AR
ex
 are adjusted for the contemporaneous ex-day return of the respective 
composite index (R
index
) for each exchange, namely, NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The Wilcoxon signed-
rank test is used for testing median values. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used for testing median 
values. *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, using a two-tailed 
test. 
 
Panel A NYSE & AMEX   NASDAQ   All Exchanges 
PDR  Open Close    Open Close    Open Close 
Obs 3,738 3,738 
 
1,985 1,985 
 
5,723 5,723 
Mean 0.798*** 0.959 
 
1.023 1.046 
 
0.876*** 0.989 
t-stat (PDR=1) -4.16 -0.67 
 
0.37 0.53 
 
-3.22 -0.22 
Median 0.866*** 0.925*** 
 
0.905*** 0.901 
 
0.876*** 0.920*** 
z-stat (PDR=1) -8.38 -2.62 
 
-3.15 -1.51 
 
-8.64 -3.01 
Min -32.685 -13.930 
 
-38.495 -12.174 
 
-38.495 -13.930 
Max 68.645 18.537 
 
28.051 19.310 
 
68.645 19.310 
Variance 8.792 14.078 
 
7.791 15.068 
 
3.136 14.421 
Skewness 2.463 0.436 
 
0.312 0.616 
 
1.795 0.504 
Kurtosis 93.087 6.348 
 
44.077 6.355 
 
78.551 6.362 
                  
Panel B NYSE & AMEX 
 
NASDAQ 
 
All Exchanges 
AR
ex
  Open Close    Open Close    Open Close 
Obs 3,764 3,764 
 
1,959 1,959 
 
5,723 5,723 
Mean 0.101%*** 0.053%** 
 
0.049%** 0.092%*** 
 
0.083%*** 0.066%*** 
t-stat (AR
ex
=0) 7.72 2.48 
 
2.48 2.74 
 
7.58 3.65 
Median 0.088%*** 0.045%** 
 
0.058%*** 0.076%** 
 
0.080%*** 0.052%*** 
z-stat  (AR
ex
=0) 9.31 2.50 
 
3.65 2.37 
 
9.64 3.40 
Min 5.110% -3.965% 
 
-4.622% -5.981% 
 
-5.110% -5.981% 
Max 5.021% 4.282% 
 
7.680% 4.293% 
 
7.680% 4.293% 
Variance 0.006% 0.017% 
 
0.008% 0.022% 
 
0.007% 0.019% 
Skewness 0.204 0.023 
 
0.668 0.046 
 
0.387 0.038 
Kurtosis 9.318 3.323   13.765 3.187   11.308 3.310 
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Table 4 
Mean Trade Return, Bid Return and Order Flow Bias;  
At the Open, Close and during the Ex-Dividend Day 
 
This table presents the breakdown of the mean total return (TR) into the mean bid return (BR) and the mean 
order flow bias (OFbias), at the opening, at the closing and in the interim minutes of the ex-dividend day, 
separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks and NASDAQ stocks, as well as for all stocks listed on all 
exchanges. TR is the minute-by-minute percentage change of the trade price and BR is the minute-by-
minute percentage change of the bid quote. The OFbias is equal to [(Locm*BASm) - (Locm-1*BASm-1)] where 
Locm is the within spread location of the trade and BASm is the proportional bid-ask spread at each minute 
m of the ex-dividend day. Loc is equal to [(P – B) / (A – B)] and BAS is equal to [(A – B) / B] where P is 
the trade price, B is the best bid quote and A is the best ask quote at the close of each minute over the ex-
dividend day. For the intra-day period between the opening and the closing of the ex-dividend day, minute-
by-minute TR, BR and OFbias are first summed over the interim minutes for each ex-dividend day, and 
then averaged across the sample of ex-dividend days. The number below the mean values is the t-statistic. a 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, using a two-tailed test. 
 
  NYSE & AMEX   NASDAQ   All Exchanges 
Minute TR BR OFbias 
 
TR BR OFbias 
 
TR BR OFbias 
Open -0.59%
a
 -0.78%
a
 0.19%
a
 
 
-0.84%
a
 -1.43%
a
 0.62%
a
 
 
-0.67%
a
 -1.00%
a
 0.34%
 a
 
 
-22.24 -28.55 27.48 
 
-17.82 -27.63 21.43 
 
-28.35 -39.24 30.09 
Interim 0.04% 0.22%
 a
 -0.18%
 a
 
 
0.10%
 
 0.70%
 a
 -0.59%
 a
 
 
0.06%
 a
 0.39%
 a
 -0.32%
 a
 
 
1.34 8.01 -26.97 
 
2.06 13.28 -20.54 
 
2.39 14.99 -29.03 
Close 0.01%
 a
 0.02%
 a
 -0.01%
 a
 
 
-0.01%
 
 -0.51%
 a
 0.56%
 a
 
 
0.00% -0.17%
 a
 0.19%
 a
 
 
3.41 5.65 -2.94 
 
-0.67 -10.73 9.51 
 
0.97 -9.90 9.16 
            All -0.54% a -0.54% a 0.00% 
 
-0.74%
 a
 -1.24%
 a
 0.59%
 a
 
 
-0.61%
 a
 -0.78%
 a
 0.21% 
 
-14.84 -14.89 0.87 
 
-11.88 -15.64 9.86 
 
-18.96 -21.43 9.75 
Obs 3,738 3,738 3,738   1,984 1,984 1,984   5,722 5,722 5,722 
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Table 5 
Relationship between PDR/AR
ex
 and OFbias at the Open and at the Close  
of the Ex-Dividend Day: Orthogonal Regressors 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics of the regressions of PDR/AR
ex
 of the 95% 
trimmed samples against OFbias and a group of control variables separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks 
and NASDAQ stocks, as well as for all stocks listed on all exchanges. The estimated equation is:  
1 2 3 4 5/
ex open
it it i it it it i itPDR AR OFbias BAS Loc TVol DY              
where, OFbias
open
 is the order flow bias at the opening of the i ex-dividend day for a particular stock, BAS 
is the proportional bid-ask spread, Loc is the within spread location of the trade, TVol is the natural 
logarithm of the trading volume over the relevant minute, and DY is the stock dividend yield equal to the 
dividend amount over the closing price on the cum-day. The subscript t refers to the time when the 
regression model is estimated, namely to either the opening or the closing of the ex-dividend day. The 
microstructure explanatory variables, namely, OFbias
open
, BAS, Loc and TVol, are orthogonalized before 
OLS coefficients are computed with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, according to the White 
(1980) correction. The number in parentheses below the coefficient is the t-statistic. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A NYSE & AMEX 
 
NASDAQ 
 
All Exchanges 
PDR Open Close 
 
Open Close 
 
Open Close 
Intercept 0.7620*** 0.9940*** 
 
1.0365*** 1.0538*** 
 
0.8825*** 1.0010*** 
 
9.69 11.10 
 
15.74 11.50 
 
20.38 18.25 
OFbias  -0.1213*** 0.0418 
 
-0.2743*** -0.0818 
 
-0.1563*** -0.0209 
 
-3.07 0.72 
 
-4.09 -0.96 
 
-3.94 -0.41 
BAS 0.2015*** -0.0745 
 
0.2290*** 0.0400 
 
0.2202*** 0.0249 
 
4.80 -1.38 
 
3.52 0.53 
 
5.10 0.55 
Loc 0.0050 -0.2015** 
 
-0.2553*** -0.2218*** 
 
-0.1145*** -0.1961*** 
 
0.13 -2.33 
 
-2.94 -2.61 
 
-3.18 -2.77 
TVol -0.0605 0.0140 
 
-0.0602 0.0803 
 
-0.0898** 0.0418 
 
-1.14 0.23 
 
-0.93 0.95 
 
-2.14 0.83 
DY 5.2185 -5.0594 
 
-1.7991*** -1.5243* 
 
-0.9473 -1.8246 
 
1.10 -1.05 
 
-2.95 -1.67 
 
-0.93 -1.65 
         Adj. R
2
  0.007 0.004 
 
0.025 0.004 
 
0.011 0.003 
F-stat 5.78 1.80 
 
6.93 2.51 
 
11.55 2.41 
Obs 3,738 3,738 
 
1,984 1,984 
 
5,722 5,722 
                  
Panel B NYSE & AMEX 
 
NASDAQ 
 
 
All Exchanges 
AR
ex
 Open Close 
 
Open Close 
 
Open Close 
Intercept 0.0012*** 0.0006* 
 
0.0003 0.0004 
 
0.0008*** 0.0004* 
 
5.75 1.94 
 
0.91 1.03 
 
4.49 1.74 
OFbias 0.0006*** 0.0001 
 
0.0011*** 0.0002 
 
0.0007*** 0.0002 
 
3.67 0.31 
 
3.51 0.46 
 
3.75 0.66 
BAS -0.0011*** 0.0003 
 
-0.0011*** -0.0006 
 
-0.0010*** -0.0003 
 
-4.99 1.05 
 
-4.19 -1.34 
 
-5.70 -1.22 
Loc 0.0001 0.0007** 
 
0.0011*** 0.0009*** 
 
0.0006*** 0.0007** 
 
0.39 2.03 
 
5.52 2.90 
 
4.64 2.43 
TVol 0.0002 -0.0002 
 
0.0001 -0.0007* 
 
0.0003** -0.0004** 
 
1.35 -0.85 
 
0.33 -1.95 
 
2.07 -2.20 
DY -0.0227 -0.0092 
 
0.0263 0.0616** 
 
0.0040 0.0372* 
 
-0.99 -0.27 
 
0.85 2.37 
 
0.19 1.83 
         Adj. R
2
  0.027 0.004 
 
0.048 0.011 
 
0.029 0.005 
F-stat 10.42 1.27 
 
15.36 4.26 
 
19.22 3.48 
Obs 3,764 3,764   1,959 1,959   5,723 5,723 
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Appendix 
 
A-3 Microstructure Rules for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
A-3.1 Rules of (Open) Limit Order Adjustment on the Ex-Dividend Day: NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ 
 
NYSE: Rule 118. Orders to Be Reduced and Increased on Ex-Date 
When a security is quoted ex-dividend, ex-distribution, ex-rights or ex-interest, the following 
kinds of orders shall be reduced by the value of the payment or rights, and increased in shares in 
the case of stock dividends and stock distributions which result in round-lots, on the day the 
security sells ex: 
(1) Open buying orders; 
(2) Open stop orders to sell. 
The following shall not be reduced: 
(1) Open stop orders to buy; 
(2) Open selling orders. 
Reduction of orders—Odd amounts.—When the amount of a cash dividend is not equivalent to or 
is not a multiple of the fraction of a dollar in which bids and offers are made in the particular 
stock, orders shall be reduced by the next higher variation. 
 
AMEX: Rule 132. Price Adjustment of Open Orders on "Ex-Date"  
(a) When a security is quoted ex-dividend, ex-distribution, ex-rights or ex-interest, the following 
kinds of orders shall be reduced by the cash value of the payment or rights, except where the 
security is quoted "ex" a stock dividend or stock distribution in which case the provisions of 
paragraph (b) below shall apply, on the day the security sells ex: 
(1) Open buying orders; 
(2) Open stop orders to sell. (With open stop limit orders to sell, the limit, as well as the stop 
price, shall be reduced.) 
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The following shall not be reduced: 
(1) Open stop orders to buy; 
(2) Open selling orders. 
 
NASDAQ: 3220. Adjustment of Open Orders 
(a) A member holding an open order from a customer or another broker/dealer shall, prior to 
executing or permitting the order to be executed, reduce, increase or adjust the price and/or 
number of shares of such order by an amount equal to the dividend, payment or distribution, on 
the day that the security is quoted ex-dividend, ex-rights, ex-distribution or ex-interest, except 
where a cash dividend or distribution is less than one cent ($.01), as follows: 
(1) In the case of a cash dividend or distribution, the price of the order shall be reduced by 
subtracting the dollar amount of the dividend or distribution from the price of the order and 
rounding the result to the next lower minimum quotation variation used in the primary market. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
(d) The term "open order" means an order to buy or an open stop order to sell, including but not 
limited to "good `till cancelled," "limit" or "stop limit" orders which remain in effect for a definite 
or indefinite period until executed, cancelled or expired. 
(e) The provisions of this Rule shall not apply to: 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………….
. 
(4) Open stop orders to buy; 
(5) Open sell orders;  
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A-3.2 Rules for Minimum Price/Quote Variations: NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
 
NYSE: Rule 62. Variations 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
The minimum price variation (MPV) for quoting and entry of orders in equity securities admitted 
to dealings on the Exchange shall be as follows: 
Price of Order or Interest Minimum Price Variation 
Less Than $1.00 $.0001 
$1.00 or greater $.01 
 
 
AMEX: Rule 127. Minimum Price Variations 
The minimum price variation for dealings in equity securities shall be one cent ($.01) 
 
NASDAQ: 4613. Market Maker Obligations 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
The minimum quotation increment for quotations of $1.00 or above in all System Securities shall 
be $0.01. The minimum quotation increment in the System for quotations below $1.00 in System 
Securities shall be $0.0001. 
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A-4 Proof of the Approximation of the Trade Return to the Sum of the Bid Return 
and the Order Flow Bias: 
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A-5 Robustness Tests: Intraday Analysis of the Ex-Dividend Day of U.S. Common 
Stocks 
 
Figure A-5.1 
Intra Ex-Dividend Day Evolution of Trading Volume; 
As a multiple of Ex-day Minute Average Trade Volume 
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of trade volume in minute intervals during the ex-dividend day 
separately for stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX and stocks listed on the NASDAQ. Trade volume per 
minute is expressed as a multiple of the ex-dividend day minute average trade volume which is 
subsequently averaged across the sample of ex-dividend days for each minute. 
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Figure A-5.2 
Intra Ex-Dividend Day Evolution of the Relative Trade Price, Ask & Bid Quotes – 
Medians 
 
This figure illustrates the evolution of the relative trade price, ask quote and bid quote averaged over 15 
minute intervals during the ex-dividend day separately for stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX and 
stocks listed on the NASDAQ. The relative trade price is the ratio of (P
ex,m
/P
cum
) where P
ex,m
 is the intra-day 
trade price at each m minute during the ex-dividend day and P
cum
 is the closing trade price at the cum-
dividend day. The relative ask quote is the ratio of (A
ex,m
/A
cum
) where A
ex,m
 is the intra-day best ask quote 
at each m minute during the ex-dividend day and A
cum
 is the closing best ask quote at the cum-dividend 
day. The relative bid quote is the ratio of (B
ex,m
/B
cum
) where B
ex,m
 is the intra-day best bid quote at each m 
minute during the ex-dividend day and B
cum
 is the closing best bid quote at the cum-dividend day. The 
minute-by-minute relative trade price, ask quote and bid quote are first averaged over 15 minute intervals 
during each ex-dividend day, and the 15 minute interval medians of the relative trade price, ask quote and 
bid quote are subsequently computed across the sample of ex-dividend days. 
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Table A-5.3 
Median Trade Return, Bid Return and Order Flow Bias:  
At the Open, Close and during the Ex-Dividend Day 
 
This table presents the breakdown of the median total return (TR) into the median bid return (BR) and the 
median order flow bias (OFbias), at the opening, at the closing and in the interim minutes of the ex-
dividend day, separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks and NASDAQ stocks, as well as for all stocks listed 
on all exchanges. TR is the minute-by-minute percentage change of the trade price and BR is the minute-
by-minute percentage change of the bid quote. The OFbias is equal to [(Locm*BASm) - (Locm-1*BASm-1)] 
where Locm is the within spread location of the trade and BASm is the proportional bid-ask spread at each 
minute m of the ex-dividend day. Loc is equal to [(P – B) / (A – B)] and BAS is equal to [(A – B) / B] 
where P is the trade price, B is the best bid quote and A is the best ask quote at each minute of the ex-
dividend day. For the intra-day period between the opening and the closing of the ex-dividend day, minute-
by-minute TR, BR and OFbias are first summed over the interim minutes for each ex-dividend day, and 
then their median is calculated across the sample of ex-dividend days. The number below the median 
values is the z-statistic computed on the basis of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for medians.
 a
 denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level, using a two-tailed test. 
 
  NYSE & AMEX   NASDAQ   All Exchanges 
Period/Var. TR BR OFbias 
 
TR BR OFbias 
 
TR BR OFbias 
Open -0.49%
 a
 -0.64%
 a
 0.09%
 a
 
 
-0.59%
 a
 -1.02%
 a
 0.27%
 a
 
 
-0.52%
 a
 -0.76%
 a
 0.12%
 a
 
 
-32.21 -37.92 35.16 
 
-28.84 -34.56 27.07 
 
-43.05 -51.42 43.84 
Interim 0.02% 0.17%
 a
 -0.08%
 a
 
 
0.13%
 a
 0.50%
 a
 -0.26%
 a
 
 
0.06%
 a
 0.26%
 a
 -0.11%
 a
 
 
1.17 8.22 -36.29 
 
3.41 14.83 -25.89 
 
3.08 15.78 -43.85 
Close 0.01%
 a
 0.01%
 a
 0.00% 
 
0.00% -0.06%
 a
 0.06%
 a
 
 
0.00%
 a
 -0.01%
 a
 0.00%
 a
 
 
6.88 8.78 -0.99 
 
-0.74 -20.14 19.93 
 
4.50 -8.13 13.63 
            All -0.45% a -0.47% a 0.00% 
 
-0.51%
 a
 -0.70%
 a
 0.06%
 a
 
 
-0.47%
 a
 -0.54%
 a
 0.00%
 a
 
 
-18.35 -18.40 -0.42 
 
-13.46 -18.32 20.13 
 
-22.71 -25.77 13.63 
Obs 3,738 3,738 3,738   1,985 1,985 1,985   5,723 5,723 5,723 
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Table A-5.4 
Relationship between PDR/AR
ex
 and OFbias at the Open and at the Close  
of the Ex-Dividend Day: Non-Orthogonal Regressors 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and their t-statistics of the regressions of PDR/AR
ex
 of the 95% 
trimmed samples against OFbias and a group of control variables separately for NYSE and AMEX stocks 
and NASDAQ stocks, as well as for all stocks listed on all exchanges. The estimated equation is:  
1 2 3 4 5/
ex open
it it i it it it i itPDR AR OFbias BAS Loc TVol DY              
where, OFbias
open
 is the order flow bias at the opening of the i ex-dividend day for a particular stock, BAS 
is the proportional bid-ask spread, Loc is the within spread location of the trade, TVol is the natural 
logarithm of the trading volume over the relevant minute, and DY is the stock dividend yield equal to the 
dividend amount over the closing price on the cum-day. The subscript t refers to the time when the 
regression model is estimated, namely to either the opening or the closing of the ex-dividend day. The OLS 
coefficients are computed with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, according to the White (1980) 
correction. The number in parentheses below the coefficient is the t-statistic. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
Panel A NYSE & AMEX   NASDAQ   All Exchanges 
PDR  Open Close 
 
Open Close 
 
Open Close 
Intercept 1.1226*** 1.0126*** 
 
1.5429*** 0.9614** 
 
1.4538*** 0.9006*** 
 
3.34 2.59 
 
4.39 2.24 
 
6.23 3.28 
OFbias -79.8212*** 12.8165 
 
-22.4495*** -5.3179 
 
-33.1814*** -2.0272 
 
-4.40 0.89 
 
-2.64 -0.79 
 
-4.20 -0.33 
BAS 38.0782*** -31.2208 
 
7.1366 0.5356 
 
13.4806*** 0.5873 
 
3.54 -1.21 
 
1.56 0.54 
 
3.12 0.60 
Loc 0.0041 -0.1882** 
 
-0.4284*** -0.4914*** 
 
-0.1981*** -0.2168*** 
 
0.06 -2.34 
 
-2.95 -2.61 
 
-3.25 -2.77 
TVol -0.0432 0.0095 
 
-0.0366 0.0439 
 
-0.0562** 0.0249 
 
-1.14 0.23 
 
-0.93 0.95 
 
-2.14 0.83 
DY 5.2185 -5.0594 
 
-1.7991*** -1.5243* 
 
-0.9473 -1.8246 
 
1.10 -1.05 
 
-2.95 -1.67 
 
-0.93 -1.65 
         Adj. R
2
  0.007 0.004 
 
0.025 0.004 
 
0.011 0.003 
F-stat 5.78 1.80 
 
6.93 2.51 
 
11.55 2.41 
Obs 3,738 3,738 
 
1,984 1,984 
 
5,722 5,722 
                  
Panel B NYSE & AMEX 
 
NASDAQ 
 
All Exchanges 
AR
ex
  Open Close 
 
Open Close 
 
Open Close 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0013 
 
-0.0008 0.0024 
 
-0.0010 0.0022** 
 
-0.04 0.88 
 
-0.78 1.38 
 
-1.41 2.01 
OFbias 0.4304*** -0.0016 
 
0.1097*** 0.0119 
 
0.1609*** 0.0148 
 
4.39 -0.02 
 
2.92 0.31 
 
4.10 0.45 
BAS -0.2225*** 0.1269 
 
-0.0450** -0.0079 
 
-0.0704*** -0.0073 
 
-3.59 0.77 
 
-2.40 -1.46 
 
-3.61 -1.36 
Loc 0.0001 0.0007** 
 
0.0018*** 0.0020*** 
 
0.0010*** 0.0008** 
 
0.45 2.03 
 
5.52 2.89 
 
4.69 2.44 
TVol 0.0002 -0.0001 
 
0.0000 -0.0004* 
 
0.0002** -0.0003** 
 
1.35 -0.85 
 
0.33 -1.95 
 
2.07 -2.20 
DY -0.0227 -0.0092 
 
0.0263 0.0616** 
 
0.0040 0.0372* 
 
-0.99 -0.27 
 
0.85 2.37 
 
0.19 1.83 
         Adj. R
2
  0.027 0.004 
 
0.048 0.011 
 
0.029 0.005 
F-stat 10.42 1.27 
 
15.36 4.26 
 
19.22 3.48 
Obs 3,764 3,764   1,959 1,959   5,723 5,723 
 
